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A Re-examination of the Per Se
Illegality of Resale Price
Maintenance

I.

Introduction

Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act' declares illegal any
contract, combination, or conspiracy in restraint of trade among the
states. During the early history of the Sherman Act this statutory
prohibition of agreements in restraint of trade was enforced literally.2 Literal interpretation of the law was subsequently deemed unduly harsh because every contract restrains trade.3 Thus, the strict
liability rule of section 1 was softened by a construction of the statute
requiring that restraints be unreasonable to be illegal.4 Proof that a
restraint is unreasonable often requires the presentation of complex
evidence.' Consequently, the Supreme Court developed certain "per
se" classes of restraints, which are conclusively presumed to be un1. 15 U.S.C. § 1(1976).
2. In United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290, 320 (1897), the Court
ruled that no exception or limitation could be judicially accomplished without incorporating
into §I what had been omitted by Congress. Construction and application of §1 of the Sherman Act thus proceeded upon the literal terms of the statute. According to this interpretation,
any contract in restraint of trade was sufficient to support liability, even if the effect of the
restraint were innocuous.
3. Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918). All contracts restrain trade to the degree that resources used in the performance of the contractual obligation
are unavailable for alternative use during performance of the contract.
4. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. I (1911). The requirement that the restraint be unreasonable is known as the rule of reason.
At common law, contracts in restraint of trade were valid unless the restraint was unreasonable. An agreement was reasonable if it fairly protected the interest of the party whom it
was intended to benefit and did not interfere with the public interest. Homer v. Graves, 131
Eng. Rep. 284, 287 (193 1). The law of contractual restraints originated with covenants, by an
individual selling his business, not to practice his trade in a defined area and for a certain
period of time. Mitchel v. Reynolds, 24 Eng. Rep. 347 (1711). General restraints of
trade-unlimited in time or place-were void, but partial restraints that were reasonable because of temporal and spatial limitations, and were assumed in exchange for consideration,
were valid. Nordenfelt v. Maxim Nordenfelt Gun & Ammunition Co., [18911 4 All E.R. 1.
5. Eg, Sommers v. Abraham Lincoln Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 66 F.R.D. 581,590 n.9
(E.D. Pa. 1975) (necessary evidence included the relevant product and geographic markets of
effective competition; "percentage of the market affected by the alleged restraint; the size and
strength of the competition; the existence or nonexistence of barriers to entry and the effect of
the practice thereon; the purpose behind the alleged restraint; and the effect of the restraint on
price or availability of products"). De Filippo v. Ford Motor Co., 378 F. Supp. 456, 461 (E.D.
Pa. 1974).

reasonable. 6 Under the test of Northern Pacofc Railway v. United
States,7 restraints are classified offensive per se because the restrictions have a pernicious effect on competition and lack any redeeming virtue.' The conclusive presumption of unreasonableness
conserves judicial resources by obviating "elaborate inquiry as to the
precise harm. . .[the restraints] have caused or the business excuse
for their use." 9
Price fixing among competitors (horizontal price fixing), which
eliminates all price competition among competing business concerns
(interbrand competition), was declared one of the first per se offenses.' 0 Subsequently, a manufacturer's setting of minimum prices
at which goods would be resold by distributors and dealers (vertical
price fixing or resale price maintenance) was also characterized as
offensive per se.11 Vertical price fixing eliminates intrabrand price
competition'" because the resellers of a particular brand of product
are precluded from engaging in price competition against each other.
Although resale price maintenance might limit intrabrand competition, the restraint can also stimulate additional interbrand competi3
tion.'
6. Eg., United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290 (1897) (price fixing
agreement among competitors); Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S.
373 (1911) (supplier-manufacturer fixed price for resale of its goods by wholesalers and retailers); Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593 (1951) (agreement by competitors to allocate markets and customers).
7. 356 U.S. 1 (1958).
8. Id at 5. The particular restraint at issue in Northern Pac#/c was a tie-in. This type
of restriction requires a purchaser to take an undesired product as a condition for obtaining a
desired product. The Northern Pacific Railway was a large landowner and the company used
the land as the tying item when it sold or leased realty. The tied item was railway service,
which the purchasers or lessees were required to use as long as the rates and services offered by
Northern Pacific were equal to those of competing carriers. The Court formulated the per se
test and judged the tying restraint by that test because the railroad possessed economic leverage, which was due to the extensive land holdings of the carrier, and because the restraint
conferred no benefit on the grantees or lessees. Id at 7-8.
9. Id at 5.
10. The embryonic per se doctrine as applied to cartel price fixing was first enunciated in
United States v. Joint Traffic Ass'n, 171 U.S. 505 (1898). The Joint Traffic cartel was composed of railroad lines serving the area between Chicago and the east coast and was formed to
eliminate price competition among various railways in the relevant market area. The agreement creating the cartel also provided severe penalties for members who charged fees below
approved rates and made termination of membership a cumbersome process. Mr. Justice
Peckham therefore declared that "an agreement of the nature of this one which directly and
effectually stifles competition, must be regarded under the statute as one in restraint of trade."
1d at 577.
Horizontal price fixing agreements are held unlawful without minute inquiry into the
reasonableness of the price because the potential power created by the agreement may become
an unreasonable restraint. United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392, 397 (1927).
11. Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911).
12. Intrabrand competition exists among resellers of a product manufactured by a single
producer. Vertical price fixing eliminates intrabrand price competition because all of the
resellers of a particular manufacturer's product must sell that product at the price set by the
producer. If resellers carry various brands of goods, resale price maintained goods of a single.
manufacturer will not encroach upon the reseller's pricing discretion for items produced by
other companies.
13. Posner, Antmust Policy and the Supreme Court.An Analysir ofthe Restricted Distribu-

The Supreme Court has announced 4 that certain nonprice vertical restrictions will not be subject to per se condemnation but will
be judged under the rule of reason 5 if the restraint advances interbrand competition.' 6 Resale price maintenance, however, has purposes and effects that promote competition while achieving
manufacturers' distributional objectives more efficiently than various
restraints that are presently subject to the rule of reason. 17 Because
of the Supreme Court's reevaluation of the applicability of the rule

of reason, the time is appropriate for a reconsideration of the per se
illegality of price fixing.'"
II. The Basis for the Prohibition Against Resale Price
Maintenance
Vertical price fixing was first declared unlawful in this country

in Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co.' 9 Although the

case originated as an equitable action for malicious interference with
contract and not as an action under section 1 of the Sherman Act, the
Court declared in dicta that its condemnation of resale price maintenance as an unreasonable restraint of trade could be grounded on

either theory.' Dr. Miles' practice of controlling the price at which
tion, Horizontal Merger and Potential Competition Decisions, 75 COLUM. L. REv. 282, 284
(1975). Resale price maintenance stimulates competition with other brands with respect to
nonprice characteristics of the item even if interbrand price competition is not encouraged. F.
SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 515 (1970). If
the resale price is fixed at a maximum, interbrand price competition will be stimulated. Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145, 159 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
14. See Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977), and notes 64-66
and accompanying text i,fr
15. See note 4 supra
16. In Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 52 n.19 (1977), Justice
Powell, speaking for the majority, declared that "[i]nterbrand competition is.. . the primary
concern of the antitrust law." Later in the opinion vertical restrictions are acknowledged as
being supportive of "interbrand competition by allowing the manufacturer to achieve certain
efficiencies in the distribution of his products." Id at 54. Thus, the Court reaffirmed that the
Northern Pacqfc test, see text accompanying note 8 supra, ought to be used to determine
whether a vertical restraint should be deemed offensive per se or judged according to its reasonableness after all relevant evidence is presented.
17. See notes 147-62 and accompanying text infra
18. This comment assumes (1) the existence of a relatively competitive market in which
no producer has a dominant market share or power, and (2) the imposition of resale price
maintenance would, if permitted, be utilized by only a few manufacturers and then only to the
extent that the aggregate market share represented by them was not large.
19. 220 U.S. 373 (1911). Dr. Miles Medical Co. (Dr. Miles) manufactured proprietary
medicines. Through a putative agency distributional system, Dr. Miles fixed the prices at
which its wholesalers and retailers would sell the medicines. A customer restriction agreement
limited those to whom the wholesalers and retailers could sell. Despite the absence of the
defendant from the Dr. Miles list of authorized customers, Park & Sons obtained some of the
price maintained preparations and sold them at the wholesale level for prices less than those
fixed by Dr. Miles. The restraint of trade issue was raised as a defense to plaintilf's charge
that Park & Sons obtained the medicines by inducing a breach of contract by one or more of
the putative agents of Dr. Miles.
20. Id at 409.

its wholesalers and jobbers would resell the products it manufactured was labelled an invalid restraint on alienation. 2 ' Since the producer had sold its goods "at prices satisfactory to itself, the public
. . . [was deemed] entitled to whatever advantage may be derived
from competition in the subsequent traffic,"2 2 and thus, resale price
maintenance could not be permitted to impede that competition.
Mr. Justice Hughes, in writing the majority opinion, conceded,
however, that if two conditions are satisfied, restraints on trade may
be valid.2 3 First, the restraint must not affect or must be reasonable
with respect to the public interest. Second, the restriction must be
reasonable with respect to the parties involved and must be "limited
to what is fairly necessary, in the circumstances of the particular

case, for the protection of the covenantee."' 24 Hence, if public policy
is not offended and the restrained party voluntarily agreed to the
limitation, the courts will not declare the restraint invalid.
Utilization of this two-pronged test presupposes judicial consideration of all evidence offered to justify the restrictive practice. The
restraint was nevertheless summarily rejected in Dr.Miles25 because
the first prong of the test, the public interest criterion, was not satisfied. Since the Court perceived vertical price fixing as having the
same purpose and effect as horizontal price fixing, the destruction of
competition,26 Justice Hughes condemned the price fixing by Dr.
Miles, without specifically analyzing the nature of the practice. By
declaring vertical price fixing illegal merely because similar restraints imposed by competitors were illegal, the Court avoided engaging in detailed factual analysis under the two-pronged
justification test.27
21. Despite the written agreement between the manufacturer and these intermediate distributors declaring that an agency relation ship existed, the Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Hughes, found that the transactions were actually sales. Id at 409.
22. Id
23. Id at 406-07. Justice Hughes' formulation was derived from Gibbs v. Consolidated
Gas Co., 130 U.S. 396, 409 (1889), in which the Court noted that the particular circumstances
of each litigation and the nature of the contract must be analyzed to determine whether the
contract is reasonable.
24. Id at 406.
25. For example, the Court questioned without answering whether an advantage accrued
to a manufacturer who instituted resale price maintenance. Id at 407.
26. Id at 408. Agreements among competitors to fix prices were deemed injurious to the
public and were long considered illegal. Id at 407.
27. See text following notes 23-24 supra Dr. Miles provided the basis for subsequent
price fixing prosecutions under §1 of the Sherman Act. Absent statutory authorization, suppliers whose transactions affect interstate commerce could not mandate the price at which their
goods would be resold without committing a per se violation of §1. See, e.g., United States v.
Line Material Co., 333 U.S. 287 (1948) (Sherman Act prohibits resale price maintenance regardless of the nature of the product sold); United States v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., 321
U.S. 707 (1944) (Sherman Act is violated even though the commodity is sold in open competition with others of the same class).

III.

Analysis of the Per Se Illegality of Resale Price Maintenance
The Sherman Act is designed to foster competition,2" and therefore, manifestly anticompetitive trade practices are branded illegal
per se. 29 Although resale price maintenance might appear antithetical to competition, that conclusion is by no means inexorable.
4.

Comparison of the Purposes and Effect of Vertical and
HorizontalPriceFixing
L

Horizontal Agreements.-

Horizontal restraints of trade

arise by agreement, either tacit or explicit, between competitors at
the same level in the chain of distribution.3" The parties to the

agreement refrain from competing with each other according to the
terms of the compact, 3 ' which results in a decline in interbrand

competition.
As noted in United States v. Trenton Potteries Co.,32 the

gravamen of the price fixing offense is that the restraint on trade is
unreasonable, and thus, whether the price charged is reasonable is
immaterial.3 3 Classic cartel price fixing34 has been adjudged illegal
28. Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958). Although the illegal practice in
NorthernPacfc was a tie-in, see note 8 supra, the Court's discussion of the per se rule and the
policies underlying the Sherman Act apply generally to § I litigation. During the floor debates
prior to the passage of the Sherman Act Senator Sherman explained that the bill
does not seek to cripple combinations of capital and labor, the formation of partnerships or of corporations, but only toprevent andcontrol combinationsmade with a view
to prevent competition, or for the restraint of trade. ... If their business is lawful,
they can combine in any way and enjoy the advantage of their united skill and capital, provided they do not combine to prevent competition.
I H. TOULMAN, A TREATISE ON THE ANTI-TRUST LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, § 1.8 at 9
(1949), citing 21 CONG. REc. 2457 (1890) (emphasis added).
29. Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 50 (1977). The standard
applied in Sylvania was the Northern Pac#Fc test, see text accompanying note 8 supra, and was
similar to policy guidelines previously followed by lower federal courts. Eg., Michelman v.
Clark-Schwebel Fiber Glass Corp., 534 F.2d 1036 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 885 (1976)
(group boycotts by suppliers and creditors to cut off a party from goods and credit are inherently anticompetitive and, thus, offensive per se); United States v. Wohl Shoe Co., 369 F.
Supp. 386 (D.N.M. 1974) (agreement among competitors to stabilize prices and eliminate competition invokes per se condemnation); Capital Temporaries, Inc. v. Olsten Corp., 365 F. Supp.
888, 891 (D. Conn. 1973) (business practices blatantly contravening market competition are
per se unreasonable).
30. Esco Corp. v. United States, 340 F.2d 1000 (9th Cir. 1965).
31. If the competitors have divided the markets where they will sell, none of the parties
may compete for sales in an area allocated to another. When prices are fixed by a cartel price,
competition is eliminated among competitors since they have agreed to charge noncompetitive
prices for similar goods.
32. 273 U.S. 392 (1927).
33. In Trenton Potteries twenty individuals and twenty-three corporations were found
guilty of fixing prices for sanitary pottery. The determination of liability was not permitted to
depend upon the reasonableness of the prices set. The restraint was declared unreasonable
merely because of the potential power created by the agreement. Id at 397-98. Eg.,
Newburgh Moire Co., Inc. v. Superior Moire Co., Inc., 105 F. Supp. 372, 374 (D.N.J. 1952).
34. When an aggregation of competitors who hold dominant market positions join forces
they can restrain trade by restricting the supply of commodities they make available for resale.

under the Sherman Act because it has been perceived to have no
effect other than the diminution of competition.35 Competitors may
not combine to tamper with a market price by purchasing the excess
supply of a commodity to place an artificial floor beneath the price,36
nor may they limit supply to stabilize price.3 Even though methods
of nonprice competition are not foreclosed by horizontal price fixing,
the availability of nonprice competition does not insulate this cartel
practice from per se condemnation. 38 Furthermore, price fixing by
competitors is not exempted from the per se prohibition when the
restraint is putatively instituted to prevent ruinous competition.39
2
Vertical Agreements.- Typically a manufacturer employs
resale price maintenance to require that the distributor to whom its
product is sold,1° and perhaps even the retailer to whom its product
See P. AREEDA, ANTITRUST ANALYSIS, PROBLEMS, TEXT, CASES ch. 2-B (2d ed. 1974); V.
MuNiD. & R. WOLF, INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION AND PUBLIC POLICY 116-17 (1971).
[I]n a competitive market each firm will take costs and prices as given and will set
output at a level maximizing returns at the given prices. A monopolist, by contrast,

since its output is the output of the industry, will recognize that the higher its output,
the lower will be the price it can charge; it will therefore adjust output and price to

maximize its return.
L. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST § 61 at 162 (1977). As the consolidated
market power of the competitors approaches the monopoly level, the cartel will be able to
wield monopoly power.
Assuming that the demand for the commodity remains constant, the same number of
dollars will be offered to purchase fewer goods. This increased pressure in the market causes
the price to rise to the point at which the funds available to purchase the goods are equal to the
price at which the total supply of the goods can be purchased. The increased price "clears"
the market and provides a higher industry-wide profit for the cartel members. Id § 61, at 162.
The "competitors" cannot defend their restrictive program by showing that the cartel was

not formed to obtain supra-competitive profits, but rather was created to become more efficient, for example, in distribution. United States v. Masonite Corp., 316 U.S. 265 (1941) (no
legal justification for a combination to fix prices of building materials, even though the effect

of the arrangement may have been to increase distribution without increasing the price to
consumers).
35. United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898), mod)fled and
aj'd, 175 U.S. 211 (1899). In Adysion Pipe a price fixing combination among six
manufacturers of cast iron pipe was found to diminish competition and, consequently, to

prevent consumers from obtaining lower prices, that result from a competitive market. Id at
292.
36. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940) (oil company cartel
purchased surplus gasoline to support the market price). The Court responded to the defense
contention that the cartel had promoted competition by allowing prices to reach a "normal"
level, by ruling that any combination that successfully aims at raising, depressing, pegging, or
stablizing the price of an item is illegal per se, provided that the commodity is in interstate
commerce.- Id at 223.
37. Since the only characteristic of a cartel price-fixed commodity that is not directly
responsive to market competition is the price, nonprice attributes may still be varied to attract
customers. Examples of these attributes include pre and post sale services and the availability
of credit terms.
38. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150(1940).
39. Phillips v. Crown Cent. Petroleum Corp., 395 F. Supp. 735, 757 (D. Md. 1975) (dictaelimination of competitive evils such as price cutting is no legal justification for a horizontal
conspiracy that secks to stabilize prices); cf.United States v. National Wholesale Druggists'
Ass'n, 61 F. Supp. 590 (D.NJ. 1945) (court rejected defense that fear of financial ruin
compelled a wholesale drug company to purchase and sell at prices fixed by a conspiracy).
40. Eg., United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29 (1960); Dr. Miles Medical Co.

is resold,4' charge a price at least equal to a preordained minimum.
The courts4 2 and commentators 43 have followed the decision of Dr.
Miles" in condemning vertical price fixing as a per se violation of
section 1 of the Sherman Act. Critics of resale price maintenance
reject any efficiency justifications offered 45 and instead find that the
purpose and effect of the restraint is merely to augment the profits
received by the resellers and the prices paid by the next buyer in the
distributive chain.' In addition, resale price maintenance is
perceived to cause inefficient resource allocation by enabling
competitively incompetent resellers to remain in business.47 If this
misallocation exists, it presumably occurs because the minimum
resale price is greater than the amount certain resellers could obtain
in a pure competitive market.4 ' The per se rule is further buttressed
by the importance of reseller independence as a social value.49
Suppliers would not be expected to vertically impose minimum
prices because that constraint prevents resellers from increasing sales
volume by setting prices below the minimum level. The restraint
may actually be imposed through the pressure of retailers who want
a guaranteed margin and who combine to persuade the supplier to
act as their agent in administering the price structure.50 Whenever
v. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911); Sunny Hill Farms Dairy Co. v. Kraftco Corp., 381 F.
Supp. 845 (E.D. Mo. 1974).
41. E.g., United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29 (1968); Dr. Miles Medical Co.
v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 363 (1911); Stan Togut Corp. v. Hobart Mfg. Co., 398 F.
Supp. 1323 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
42. E.g., United States v. Line Material Co., 333 U.S. 287 (1948); United States v. Bausch
& Lomb Optical Co., 321 U.S. 707 (1944); Lessig v. Tidewater Oil Co., 327 F.2d 459 (9th Cir.
1964); See Cecil Corley Motor Co. v. General Motors Corp., 380 F. Supp. 819, 833 (M.D.
Tenn. 1974).
43. L. SULLIVAN, supra note 34, § 135 at 385-87; Elman, Petroed Opinions and
Competitive Realities, 66 COLUM. L. REV. 625, 628 (1966); Rahl, Price Competition and the
Price Fixing Rule - Preface and Perspective, 57 Nw. U. L. REV. 137 (1962).
44. 220 U.S. 373 (1911).
45. See text accompaying notes 149-55 infra
46. F. SCHERER, supra note 13, at 515; Hollander, United States, RESALE PRICE
MAINTENANCE 95 (B. Yamey ed. 1966). But see Gould & Preston, Resale Price Maintenance
and Retail Outlets, 32 ECONOMICA 302 (1965).
47. Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145, 157 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting); F. SCHERER,
supra note 13, at 406-07. Presumably, consumer preferences determine how resources are
allocated in the production of desired commodities. If a reseller cannot earn sufficient profit
without having the minimum price of an item determined by its supplier, then the resources
used in manufacturing and selling the article merit reallocation to production and marketing
of a product whose sale will provide adequate income for its distributors. See V. MUND & R.
WOLF, supra note 34, at 53-4.
48. This explanation presupposes that the demand for the particular brand of product is
not dampened by a supra-competitive price.
49. F. SCHERER, supra note 13, at 514 (the social value is derived from populist ideology
and political appeasement); L. SULLIVAN, supra note 34, § 135 at 385-86; see note 127 and
accompanying text infra.
50. Retailers would benefit if a single producer (or a group of manufacturers) using
resale price maintenance had entrenched market power. Profit per unit sold would increase as
the minimum resale price is raised, while the market power enjoyed by the particular brand or
brands would prevent significant decrease in sales volume. Manufacturers will accede to

this situation arises it is properly treated as a horizontal conspiracy5
because it is created for the benefit of resellers at the same level in
the distributive chain. Absent this type of reseller coercion, a
reasonable supplier would not establish a price so great that net
income decreases because fewer units of a product are purchased. 2
Moreover, if the resellers' trade is based on high turnover and low
prices, their supplier would face opposition to the minimum pricing
program.5 3 Yet even if a manufacturer has unilaterally embarked
upon a course of resale price maintenance, there should be no
conclusive presumption that it is identical in purpose and result to
cartel action.'
3. InterbrandCompetition.- Unlike cartel price fixing, resale
price maintenance need not be aimed at obtaining monopoly
profits.5" The mere implementation of a price restraint poses no
demands for resale price maintenance for two correlative reasons: to gain favor among dealers
and to prevent retailers from treating certain articles harshly. SULLIVAN, supra note 34, § 134
at 383.
51. Bork, The Rule afReason and the Per Se Concept Price Fixing and Market Division,
75 YALE L.J. 375, 406 (1965); Posner, supra note 13, at 283; see White Motor Co. v. United
States, 372 U.S. 253, 267 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring) (same rationale applies when dealers
convince their supplier to impose territorial restrictions).
52. Posner, supra note 13, at 290.
If unconstrained price competition were permitted, manufacturers would benefit from the
increased sales volume by the amount of profit earned in selling additional units of the product
to resellers. Bowman, The PrerequisitesandEffects fResale PriceMaintenance, 22 U. CHI. L.
REV. 825, 832-33 (1955). Bowman found that "[m]ost manufacturers do not find resale price
maintenance in their interest because it is inconsistent with selling the most merchandise at the
lowest possible cost. Dealer competition forces the development of efficient merchandising
methods, making for lower retail prices and greater sales without reducing per-unit return to
manufacturers." Id at 848-49. He further postulated that resale price maintenance will only
be found when either dealers or a manufacturer has a monopoly. Id at 849.
53. Bowman, supra note 52, at 831.
These discount operations are able to sell at lower prices because their high-volume
purchases and sales make them more efficient than small retail concerns. When the larger,
low-margin businesses are forced to resell at the same prices as the smaller stores, the primary
competitive advantage of the discounter disappears. Although profit margins per unit would
increase when the discounter must sell its goods at a higher minimum price, the price cutter's
net profit may decline when consumers realize that certain items are no longer available at
lower prices. Furthermore, "preventling] large retailers from pursuing a low-margin strategy
• . .[frustrates] the adaptation of distribution channels to meaningful changes in consumer
wants and. . .[encourages] the perpetuation of obsolete inefficient channels." F. SCHERER,
supra note 13, at 514.
In certain circumstances, however, the immediate satisfaction of consumer desires and the
elimination of inefficient channels of distribution may be postponed if the achievement of
those goals would contravene the policy of antitrust laws to stimulate interbrand competition.
In the limited circumstances in which vertical price fixing can aid interbrand competition, the
goals of consumer sovereignty and efficiency must assume a subordinate position. See
sections III and IV infra for a discussion of those circumstances.
54. See Comanor, Vertical Territorialand Customer Restrictions: White Motor and Its
Aftermath, 81 HARv.L. REV. 1419 (1968). In a competitive industry in which a manufacturer
fixes resale prices, the "manufacturer will benefit from dealer markups which exceed
competitive levels when the resulting revenues are used by the dealer to create consumer
preferences for the manufacturer's products." Id at 1425.
55. See note 34 supra (discussing the motive behind horizontal price fixing), and text
accompanying notes 146-62 in/ra (indicating that resale price maintenance may be used to
promote interbrand competition); Bork, supra note 51, at 403 (since a supplier's motive for

danger that the manufacturer has obtained additional power to
restrict output of the generic commodity.5 6 Since the manufacturer is
but one supplier of a product, any deliberate diminution of output
could cause its share of the market to shrink." Furthermore, resale

price maintenance would not result in unduly high prices as long as
the manufacturer's product remains subject to interbrand
competition. If the commodity becomes too expensive,
purchasers
58
will substitute other brands of the same product.
By imposing resale price maintenance, the supplier eliminates

intrabrand price competition among dealers of its own product and,
thus, permits these resellers to concentrate on interbrand nonprice
competition. 9 For this reason the blanket prohibition of the per se

rule as applied to horizontal price fixing is inappropriate in the
context of resale price maintenance.
Relevant considerations in assessing the effects of resale price
maintenance include the "impact on the product market as a whole
(interbrand and intraband), the extent of interbrand competition
foreclosed, and the procompetitive effect on interbrand
competition."' The first element, market impact, is significant
because it recognizes that nonprice competition persists and may still
affect interbrand competition. Analysis under the second
consideration rests largely on the effect of the third element because
some interbrand competition will be foreclosed only if the restraint
causes the supplier's market share to increase.6 ' Thus, the third
consideration is determinative. To the extent that the price fixing
imposing resale price maintenance will not be to restrict output, the supplier will not obtain
monopoly profits).
56. Bork, supra note 51, at 402.
57. The market share will decrease only if the supplier previously had been able to sell
all of its output and if demand for the article remains at the same level after output is
constrained.
58. Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 52 n.19 (1977); Bork, supra
note 51, at 475 n.207; Note, Restricted Channels of Distribution Under the Sherman Act, 75
HARV. L. REv. 795, 800 (1962) [hereinafter cited as Restricted Channels].
59. Although vertical price fixing eliminates intrabrand price competition, all forms of
intrabrand competition are not curtailed. Indeed resale price maintenance may be instituted
to force resellers to engage in significant nonprice competition. See text accompanying notes
152-55 infr. The Supreme Court has recognized that "manufacturers have an economic
interest in maintaining as much intrabrand competition as is consistent with the efficient
distribution of their products." Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 56
(1977). In addition, vertical price fixing may cause any short-term decline in competition to
be more than compensated by long-term stimulation.
ON TRADE REGULATION 417 (4th ed. 1967).

M. HANDLER, CASES AND MATERIALS

60. ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REp. (BNA) 3-A (Nov. 10, 1977) (citing remarks on
vertical restraints by Michael L. Denger at a jointly sponsored Federal Bar Ass'n. - Bureau of
National Affairs, Inc. conference, in the national capital area, Nov. 2-3, 1977). In Continental
T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 57 n.27 (1977) the balancing of intrabrand and
interbrand competitive effects of vertical restrictions was acknowledged as a proper exercise of
the judicial function.
61.

See L. BOONE & D. KURTZ, CONTEMPORARY MARKETING, 343-44 (1974).

program is successful in encouraging resellers to focus their efforts
on interbrand competition, the market share of the restraining
manufacturer will increase.62

Promotion of interbrand competition is, by definition,
antithetical to cartel arrangements, and as enunciated in Continental
T V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 6 3 it is the primary concern of
antitrust law. The challenged practice in Sylvania was the
enforcement of a clause that limited the location where resellers
could sell Sylvania televisions. Continental T.V. maintained that
the restriction was illegal per se under the rule of United States v.
Arnold, Schwinn & Co.64 Sylvania explicitly overruled Schwinn,65
however, and established that market division and customer
restraints are to be judged under rule of reason analysis.
Mr. Justice Powell, speaking for the Court, recognized that

"[viertical restrictions promote interbrand competition by allowing
the manufacturer to achieve certain efficiencies in the distribution of
his products." In removing this restraint of trade from the per se
analysis of the Northern Pacific test 67 because of this "redeeming
virtue, ' ' 68 he concluded that its "anticompetitive effects . . . can be
"...69
adequately policed under the rule of reason .
Justice Powell acknowledged the substantial scholarly and

judicial support for the economic utility of vertical restrictions, but

found scant authority for the contrary position.7" Perhaps if the
Court had been confronted with a vertical price restraint, it might
have paused to consider whether the interbrand competitive merits
from the practice merited removal from the per se catagory.7 ' The
62. Posner, supra note 13, at 283-84.
63. 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
64. 388 U.S. 365 (1967). The Schwinn Court, in condemning vertical restraints imposed
by a party that no longer owned the controlled commodity, had declared illegal per se a
manufacturer's restrictions limiting the rights of resellers to engage in trans actions in specified
areas and with particular classes of customers.
65. 433 U.S. at 58.
66. Id at 54.
67. Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958). See text accompanying note 8
supra.

68. Mr. Justice Powell remarked that improving interbrand competition through vertical
restrictions constituted a redeeming virtue. Continental T.V., Inc. v. Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S.
36, 54 (1977).
69. 433 U.S. at 59. The particular vertical restrictions were those that had been judged
under the rule of reason prior to the Schwinn decision. Id
70. Id at 57-58.
The contrary position abhores interference with the discretion of traders in the conduct of
their businesses and is not concerned with the effect of a particular agreement. See Sunny
Hill Farms Dairy Co. v. Kraftco Corp., 381 F. Supp. 845, 853 (E.D. Mo. 1974). Furthermore,
as Professor Comanor contends, consumers benefit when dealers are not constrained by
suppliers. Comanor, supra note 54, passim
71. See text accompanying notes 149-62 infra (discussion of the procompetitive
interbrand effect of vertical price fixing).
In footnote eighteen the Court carefully emphasized that its holding did not alter the per
se illegality of resale price maintenance, 433 U.S. at 51 n. 18, which was, of course, proper

Court was not so confronted, however, and its failure to venture an
opinion on the question does not support a conclusion that the
competitive effects of resale price maintenance are less beneficial
then those of other vertically imposed restraints. Moreover, the
stimulative effects of resale price maintenance on interbrand
competition are as easily analyzed as the effects of nonprice vertical
restraints.72
Justice Powell affirmed the need to consider market factors as
objective standards essential to antitrust policy. 7" In his concurring
opinion, Justice White specifically recommended that product
differentiation and market share should be adopted as the relevant
tests to gauge market power and, consequently, to determine
whether an unreasonable restraint of trade has been effected. 74 The
degree of product differentiation affects the willingness of consumers
to substitute goods of one firm for those of a competitor. As the
degree of differentiation increases, the substitutability of products
decreases; the commodity becomes unique. 7" Any vertical restraint
on a product that is already highly differentiated might be found
illegal under the rule of reason.76 Market share is also analogously
material, for as the percentage sales of a particular manufacturer's
product becomes dominant in the market for that type of
commodity, the producer's ability to exercise monopoly
of
any
control-and
thus
the
unreasonableness
restraint-increases.77
because on certiorari the case did not call the rule into question. Justice Powell did concede,
however, that Sylvania could have employed a more restrictive provision than the location
clause, which would have been tested under the rule of reason. Id at 59.
72. There will be differences, however, between the effects of vertical price and nonprice
restraints, especially in relation to intrabrand competition. For example, price maintenance
only eliminates price competition, while effective vertical market division (see section III.B.3
,nfra) removes all forms of intrabrand competition in the allocated areas.
73. 433 U.S. at 53 n.21.
74. Id at 64 (White, J., concurring) (these criteria were adopted because they had been
developed by economists as proper determinants of market power).
75. Differentiation is based on actual difference in the quality and nature of the product
in addition to perceived differences that result from advertising. When substitutability is low,
a manufacturer may charge a price greater than that obtained by rival enterprises without
experiencing a significant decline in demand for the differentiated article. Thus, higher prices
and monopoly returns are the general consequences of product differentiation. Comanor,
supra note 54, at 1423-24. See F. SCHERER, supra note 13, at 324-45.

76. The manufacturer of a highly differentiated product possesses a near monopoly
attributable to the uniqueness of the item. The market share of a unique item represents the
entire market for that commodity because no sufficiently similar substitutes exist. When the
nonhomogeneity of a product causes its market share to expand, it will become increasingly
difficult for any party imposing vertical distributional restraints to prove the reasonableness of
those restraints.

Restricted Channels, supra note 58, at 832-33.

77. If the manufacturer obtained or attempted to obtain a monopoly, it would also be
subject to liability under § 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1976).

(a) Circumstances in which resaleprice maintenance stimulates
interbrandcompetition.- In certain instances utilization of vertical
price fixing might be the optimal method of promoting interbrand
competition. Such circumstances exist in the cases of failing (and
perhaps faltering) firms, new businesses, or businesses entering new
product lines.7 8

The failing company exception is analogous to the failing firm
defense 79 in merger litigation under section 7 of the Clayton Act.8"
Mergers that would otherwise be prohibited are allowed under the

failing company defense primarily because the acquired failing
business no longer holds a competitive market position8

and

therefore, permitting the merger will not injure competition within
the industry. The failing company exception for resale price
maintenance should also be permissible because a collapsing
enterprise's use of the restraint will not harm competition. To the
contrary, if the restraint succeeds, competition will be stimulated
because an additional viable company has become a member of the
industry.

Interbrand competition may also be intensified by the entry of
new firms into established product markets.8 2 When the new firm
commences operations, it is at a disadvantage in relation to
established businesses, not necessarily because of inefficiency but

merely because the recent entrant is not a "going" concern.83 Also, if

an existing firm enters a new product line, that company may be at a
competitive disadvantage for the same reason. Since new entry may
often require a great initial capital investment and since the free
78. Louis, VerticalDistributionalRestraintsUnder Schwinn and Sylvanz An Argumentfor
the Continuing Use ofa PartialPer Se Approach, 75 MICH. L. Rv. 275, 296 (1976); c. White
Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 263 (1963) (Court suggested that these special
circumstances may remove vertical territorial allocation from condemnation under the per se
rule). See also United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 348 U.S. 270, 275-76 (1966) (purpose of
the 1950 amendments to the Clayton Antitrust Act was to preserve large numbers of small
competitors to prevent concentration in the American economy); Annot., 11 ALR. FED. § 858
(1972).
79. The failing company defense was first adopted in International Shoe Co. v. FTC, 280
U.S. 291 (1930) to save certain mergers from judicial invalidation. This defense was preserved
by explicit reference in the legislative history of the amendments of 1950 to the Clayton Act.
H.R. REP. No. 1191, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1949); S. REP. No. 1775, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 7
(1950).
The elements of the defense include: (1) proof that the acquired company was on the
brink of financial ruin; (2) a showing that no prospective purchaser of the failing concern other
than the eventual acquirer existed; and (3) proof that there is little likelihood that the acquired
failing company would emerge from reorganization as a competitive business entity. United
States Steel v. FTC, 426 F.2d 592, 608 (6th Cir. 1970).
80. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1976).
81. See note 79 supra
82. Comanor, supra note 54, at 1438 n.33. Cf.Akron Tire Supply Co. v. Gebr. Hofmann
KG, 390 F. Supp. 1395, 1403 (N.D. Ohio 1974) (vertical market division may be permissible in
distribution of a new product).
83. Comment, Vertical Territorialand Customer Restrictions in the FranchisingIndustry,
10 COLUM. J. OF L. & Soc. PRoB. 497, 513 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Vertical Restrictions].

market may disregard the benefits of new entry,84 resale price
maintenance can assist the new entrant to recoup the investment by
encouraging resellers to promote the new commodity in interbrand
competition." This theory was recognized in UnitedStates v. Jerrold
Electronics Corp.8 6 Defendant offered a new product, cable
television, and required, in part, that subscribers use only parts it
supplied and that the home reception systems be repaired only by
defendant's employees. The court reasoned that the tying restraint
was warranted while defendant sought to establish itself but that the
restriction became unreasonable after the commercial status of the
venture became secure.87
The producer may also be impelled to establish resale prices in
response to selfish business motives of resellers who may treat the
price maintained commodity more favorably because of the
guaranteed earnings margin per unit.88 In addition, vertically
imposed prices may facilitate recruitment of new dealers because of
the guaranteed minimum return per unit and also because the new
dealers will not be pressured to engage in price competition. 89 Thus,
vertical price fixing is used to encourage resellers to increase the
manufacturer's market share and not to price the manufacturer out
of business. 9
It might be contended that it is preferable for suppliers to
terminate operations rather than be permitted to set the prices at
which goods are resold.9" This argument is persuasive but ignores
the primary purpose of the antitrust law--to promote interbrand
competition.9 2 Such competition may be served by resale price
maintenance in the instance of failing firms and new entrants as long
as the restraint is used only as a temporary remedy until the
manufacturer is in less dire commercial straits.9 3
(b) Maximum price fixing.- In Albrecht v. Herald Co.94
maximum resale price fixing was judgedoffensive per se. The Court
condemned this distributional practice because of the possibility that
84. The values include increased interbrand competition and technological advances
resulting from the efforts of new businesses and new product lines.
85. See text accompanying notes 149-55 infra; cf.Comanor, supra note 54, at 1437 (new
entrants should be permitted to use vertical territorial and customer allocation to facilitate
investment recoupment).
86.

187 F. Supp. 545 (E.D. Pa. 1960), afldper curiam, 365 U.S. 567 (1961).

87.

Id at 558, 561.

88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145, IS8 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
Bowman, supra note 52, at 848; see Louis, supra note 78, at 296-300.
V. MUND & R. WOLF, supra note 34, at 190; F. SCHERER, supra note 13, at 514.
See notes 47-48 and accompanying text supra.
See text accompanying note 63 supra
See text accompanying note 87 supra
390 U.S. 145 (1968).

the price ceiling might be an unjustifiable intrusion upon the ability
of buyers to compete and might ultimately be set too low for dealers
to furnish essential services in conjunction with the product.95 This
possibility, however, "presupposes a somewhat suicidal supplier and
ignores the obvious purpose to protect the broad value image of the
product . . from the dealer who is tempted to extort high prices
96
from his customers.

Justice Harlan dissented in Albrecht and defended the price
ceiling as serving the public interest. He postulated that this
constraint would effectively propel "prices toward the level that
would be set by intense competition, and they cannot go below this
level unless the manufacturer who dictates them and the customer
who accepts them have both miscalculated."97 Since distributors
voluntarily sought to operate under the maximum price constraint,9"
it may be presumed that they believed it was possible to conduct
business and still earn a profit. This demonstrates that distributors
need not be unreasonably restrained by the maximum resale price.
Furthermore, vertical maximum price fixing can remove
unreasonable restraints on interbrand competition by destroying
price fixing cartels at lower levels in the chain of distribution.99
Comparison of Vertical Nonprice Restraints with Vertical Price
Restraints
Numerous types of vertical restrictions other than resale price
maintenance have been used by producers to obtain advantages in
the distribution process. Some of the more significant ones include
limitations on the customers with whom resellers may deal, exclusive
dealing agreements between a supplier and reseller, requirements
contracts, reciprocal dealing arrangements, and allocation of territory where a reseller may transact business.
Although Schwinn'o classified some of these restrictions as offensive per se when imposed by a supplier that had parted with title
to the item,'' the Sylvania0 2 Court ruled that the common-law polB.

95. Id at 152-53; accord, Rabl, supra note 43, at 142.
96. Maher, On the Pathfrom White to Schwinn to Sylvania to. . . , 82 DICK. L. REv.
433, 445 (1978). Prtfessor Maher also responded to a fear expressed in Albrecht that

maximum price fixing would channel distribution through a few powerful dealers by asserting
that "this possibility is countered by the reality that small dealers are often under price cutting
pressure from more advantaged competitors." Id at 446.
97.

390 U.S. at 159 (Harlan, J., dissenting).

Contra, L. SULLIVAN, supra note 34, § 138 at

390-91.
98. This was illuminated by excluded evidence that * dicated a number of individuals
were willing to distribute newspapers for the Herald Co. at tr below the price limitation. 390
U.S. at 167 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
99. Bork, supra note 51, at 464. The manufacturer could accomplish this by merely
refusing to deal with any reseller who adheres to a horizontal pricing agreement.
100. 388 U.S. 365 (1967).
101. Id at 379.
102.

433 U.S. 36 (1977).

icy against restraints on alienation was irrelevant to the issue of "the
effect of the antitrust laws upon vertical distributional restraints in
the American economy today." 103 Thus, the Court eliminated one of
4 Given the
the fundamental arguments against vertical restrictions. 10
manufacturers' vital interest in the marketing of their products, especially when they design, produce, and promote their goods to reach a
particular segment of consumers, 0 5 the utility of these vertical nonprice restrictions for increasing interbrand competition must be evaluated.
1.

Limitations on Customers.-

Customer restrictions had not

been declared illegal per se before Schwinn," therefore, they are not
subject to the per se rule today."6 These constraints limit intrabrand
competition, although the extent of the limitation depends upon the
focus of the restraint. If resellers are forbidden from dealing with
particular accounts, for example certain fleet accounts as in White
Motor Co. v. United States,

7

intrabrand competition for these

customers is eliminated and interbrand rivalry might decrease.' 08
The defendant in White Motor maintained that its customer
restriction was necessary because distributors of White's products
could not provide an adequate supply of vehicles and repair parts
and because the reservation of fleet accounts would ensure the
manufacturer that volume buyers would receive an appropriate
discount. It argued that if customers reservations were not
available, White would suffer a substantial loss of goodwil. 1°9 The
103. Id at 53 n.21.
104. The rejection of the restraint on alienation argument also undermines part of the
decision in Dr. Miles. See text accompanying note 21 supra
105. Elman, supra note 43, at 628.
In the contemporary commercial world a manufacturer is held liable if its advertising is
false or misleading and if its product causes personal or property damage because of negligent
design or construction.
[Alt the federal level, apart from the more specialized requirements, manufacturers of
consumer products have safety responsibilities under the Consumer Product Safety
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2051 et seq. (1970 ed., Supp. V), and obligations for warranties
under the Consumer Product Warranties Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2301 el seq. (1970 ed.,
Supp. V). Similar obligations are imposed by state law .... [Furthermore t]he legitimacy of these concerns has been recognized in cases involving vertical restrictions.
Continental TV., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 55 n.21 (1977). The legitimate
interest of the manufacturer in imposing distributional restraints is also apparent when the
restraint may determine the magnitude of a manufacturer's post-sale obligations-for example, if the producer has undertaken to complete repairs. Elman, supra note 43, at 630.
106. Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 59 (1977) (vertical
restrictions are governed by the rule of reason that existed prior to Schwinn).
107. 372 U.S. 253 (1963).
108. Intrabrand competition is constrained because the manufacturer does not permit its
distributors to compete against it or against each other for the customers. Interbrand
competition may decline because the producer has deprived itself of the selling efforts of its
existing distribution system.
109. 372 U.S. at 257; f United States v. Jerrold Electronics Corp., 187 F. Supp. 545 (E.D.

evidence suggested, however, that the restraint was more stringent
than necessary because White would not have been seriously
threatened by its distributors had it competed with them." 0
Furthermore, if White had been apprehensive that its resellers would
damage the goodwill of the business, it could have ceased
distributing through resellers and conducted transactions either
centrally or by expanding its operations into the retail level."' The
aggregate effect of reserving specific accounts to the manufacturer is
to restrain resellers without necessarily promoting interbrand
competition. The lack of any redeeming virtue for this restraint
indicates that a court presented with this customer restriction might
2
properly apply the per se rule."
A second customer restraint is intended to protect the producer
and its dealers from damage inflicted by unauthorized outlets." 3
When a manufacturer limits resale to the dealers it has approved,
short-term intrabrand competition opportunities may decline, but
long-term interbrand competition may be preserved by foreclosing
outlets that operate irresponsibly or do not provide essential "extras"
such as post-sale service.'"' Although it may "tend to keep prices up
by preventing goods from getting into the hands of

. .

. price

cutters,""' 5 this form of restraint also preserves the manufacturer's
goodwill by helping to ensure that the resellers know how to deal
with the product." 6 Since a factual determination of the positive
Pa. 1960), aftdper curiam, 365 U.S. 567 (1961) (repair service contract tied to cable television
service was reasonable to protect goodwill until the new cable television industry became
established).
110. If the large accounts could not obtain adequate service or an appropriate discount,
the manufacturer would not lose these direct sales to its own resellers.
111. See, e.g., L. BOONE & D. KURTZ, supra note 61, at 200 (Electrolux vacuum cleaners
are marketed to consumers by the manufacturer's large sales force).
112. Neither the per se rule nor the rule of reason was applied to the customer reservation
in White Motor because the defendant submitted to a consent decree. [1964] TRADE REG.
REP. (CCH) 71,195.
113. Restricted Channels, supra note 58, at 819; see, e.g., United States v. Arnold, Schwinn
& Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967); United States v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., 321 U.S. 707, 714,
716 (1944); Green v. Electric Vacuum Cleaner Co., 132 F.2d 312, 313 (6th Cir. 1940), cert.
granted, 318 U.S. 753, cert. dismissed, 319 U.S. 777 (1943).
114. Restricted Channels, supra note 58, at 830.
115. Id
116. E.g., Tripoli Co. v. Wella Corp., 425 F.2d 932 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 831
(1970). In this case the manufacturer's prohibition on resale of its beauty care products by
barbers and beauticians was upheld after the defendant demonstrated the reasonableness of its
restrictions by proving that misuse of many of its products could cause blindness, scalp
irritation, or brittleness of hair. The decision was based on the alternative grounds that either
the restraint was in the public interest or it was reasonable in providing protection against
potential product liability claims. In United States v. Jerrold Electronics Corp., 187 F. Supp.
545 (E.D. Pa. 1960), affdper curiam, 365 U.S. 567 (1961), a prohibition on resale of separate
components of a cable television system was held reasonable during the incipiency of the cable
television industry. Jerrold imposed the restraint to prevent other brands of equipment from
being used in conjunction with its components because the manufacturer could not guarantee
the efficacy of its products unless those items were used as an integrated whole.

effects on interbrand competition is necessary to evaluate the
redeeming virtues, a rule of reason is properly applicable.
When a supplier provides that resale by its dealers be "for use
only," retail buyers are prevented from "dumping" the product at a
price below cost." 7 The restraint, if it seeks to frustrate dumping,
may promote interbrand rivalry by minimizing both the disruptions
in the producer's distributional system and the alienation of regular
outlets that results from the depressed market caused by the
dumping. 18 Similarly, if the provision is intended to keep the
commodity out of the hands of irresponsible price cutters it may
ultimately aid interbrand competition with little negative intrabrand
effect.'
Since the objective of the restraint under these
circumstances is to promote interbrand competition, the rule of
reason should be applied to determine whether this goal has been
achieved.
The "hands-off" period is a customer restriction that prohibits
other resellers from seeking to consummate the sale of a product
during a predetermined period after one of the manufacturer's
resellers has expended effort in seeking to make a sale.' 20 This
restriction prevents a second dealer from taking advantage of the
efforts of another and, thus, closing the transaction at a lower price
because of lower selling costs. Intrabrand competition is
temporarily foreclosed, but if no sale occurs in the interim, no
restriction remains. It is likely that fewer distributors would be
willing to perform their function if pre-sale activities are unavailing.
While a decrease in resellers might diminish intrabrand competition,
its effect on interbrand rivalry cannot be predicted. A less restrictive
practice would require a dealer who consummates the transaction to
reimburse and pay a small profit to a dealer who incurs cost but does
not make a sale. 12 ' This less restrictive' option could be used instead
of a practice that is clearly anticompetitive and has no evident
redeeming virtue. Therefore, the hands-off provision might
appropriately be subjected to per se analysis.
117. Restricted Channels, supra note 58, at 831. The requirement that an item be sold "for
use only" precludes sellers from transferring the commodity to those who would resell the
good. This provides the supplier with additional control over the distributive chain to ensure
that buyers are "consumers" of the product. See, e.g., Janel Sales Corp. v. Lanvin Parfums,
Inc., 396 F.2d 398, 400, 406 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 938 (1968); Coca Cola v. State, 225
S.W. 791, 794 (Tex. Civ. App. 1920).
118. Restricted Chanmels, rupra note 58, at 830.
119. The interbrand competitive position of a product can easily be eroded, despite the
low price at which it is sold, if the product receives inadequate presale preparation or
inadequate repairs. By using resellers with proven ability and an adequate profit margin that
encourages those dealers to maintain the producer's goodwill, the supplier can avoid a
potential threat to long-run interbrand competition at the cost of limited price competition.
120. Restricted Channels, supra note 58, at 831-32.
121. Id at 832.

2 Exclusive Dealing, Requirements Contracts, and Reciprocal
Dealing.- 21 2 When a manufacturer and its resellers enter into
exclusive dealing agreements, sales outlets are foreclosed to the

manufacturer's competitors.

Although this foreclosure minimizes

interbrand competition, these restraints are analyzed under the rule
of reason. 123 A possible explanation for this judicial treatment is that
if outlets can sell only a single manufacturer's product, interbrand
competition increases because the reseller must concentrate on

competing with the products of other manufacturers. Intrabrand
competition is not diminished because no restrictions on resale of the
item have been imposed. Nevertheless, new entry on the
manufacturing level is impeded because the "exclusives" have
eliminated a portion of the market from interbrand sales
competition. 2 4 New competition would then require simultaneous
entry on two levels because a would-be supplier must also engage in
retailing to obtain an outlet for the product. Given the capital

constraints of many enterprises, such a substantial undertaking may
.not be feasible.' 2 5
Requirements contracts obligate the seller to provide or the
buyer to purchase all of a certain commodity that is needed by the
26
latter for a specified period. These contracts are not illegal per se,'

although they limit interbrand competition by foreclosing a share of
122. In addition to potential § I liability under the Sherman Act, these business practices
are subject to the more explicit provisions of § 3 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1976),
which, in pertinent part, declares any contract for the sale of commodities illegal if the sale is
made on the condition that the purchaser shall not use or deal in commodities of a competitor
of the seller, when the effect of the contract may substantially lessen competition or tend to
create a monopoly. Because the § 3 prohibitions of the Clayton Act are more specific than § I
of the Sherman Act, violations under the former are subject to a less rigorous standard of
proof.

123. Beloit Culligan Soft Water Serv., Inc. v. Culligan, Inc., 274 F.2d 29, 33 (7th Cir.
1959).
124. Eg., Bales v. Kansas City Star Co., 336 F.2d 439 (8th Cir. 1964) (newspaper
publisher contractually required distributor not to sell any other newspaper); Tire Sales Corp.
v. Cities Serv. Oil Co., 410 F. Supp. 1222 (N.D. IMI.1976).
125. Bowman, supra note 52, at 847; see Continental T.M., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433
U.S. 36, 56 (1977); cf SULLVAN, SUpra note 34, § 156 at 447-48 (capital aggregation problems
prevent new entry from eroding the power of suppliers who use tie-in arrangements).
126. United States v. American Can Co., 87 F. Supp. 18, 31 (N.D. Cal. 1949); see Tampa
Elec. Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320 (1961); Isaly Dairy Co. v. United Dairy Farmers,
250 F. Supp. 99 (W.D. Pa. 1966).
Requirements contracts are not illegal per se because they are not manifestly
anticompetitive. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 330 (1962). In a comparison
of requirements contracts with the vertical aspects of mergers, however, the Court cautioned
that the absence of innate anticompetitive attributes
will not save a particular agreement if, in fact, it is likely "substantially to lessen
competition, or to create a monopoly" [according to the criteria of § 3 of the Clayton
Act].. .. Yet a requirement contract may escape censure if only a small share of the
market is involved, if the purpose of the agreement is to insure to the customer a
sufficient supply of a commodity vital to the customer's trade or to insure to the
supplier a market for his output and if there is no trend toward concentration in the
industry.
Id at 330-31.

the market from competitors.

between

Furthermore, such agreements

small local entrepreneurs and large suppliers may

detrimentally affect the social structure. Local dealers may, in
effect, become the employees of absentee owners, which results in a
dilution of local leadership through the dependency of community
businessmen upon outside interests. 27 Contracting parties, however,
enter these agreements for any number of reasons,128 and if a buyer
decides to obtain its requirements 12for
a specified commodity from a
9

single seller, he can validly do So.
Reciprocal buying is a similar practice according to which a
supplier purchases some items from those it supplies with other
commodities. Reciprocity may be purely voluntary and forecloses
no greater portion of the market than if the reciprocating buyer
obtained his items from another source. 130 While rivalry at the
interbrand level may be constrained by this practice, competition is
unquestionably impaired if the reciprocity involves coercion., 3'
Thus, coercive reciprocity should be analyzed by the per se rule
because it is manifestly anticompetitive if purchases are made only
in response to coercion. 132
3. TerritorialRestrictions.-Amanufacturer imposes territorial
restrictions to limit the area in which distributors and dealers may
resell the manufacturer's commodities. Geographical customer

127. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 318-19 (1949) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting). Douglas criticized the curse of bigness when "[c]lerks responsible to a superior in
a distant place take the place of resident proprietors beholden to no one," and concluded that
this is a price paid by the nation "for the almost ceaseless growth of bigness on the part of
industry." Id at 319.
128. Buyers may wish to obtain requirements contracts to
assure supply, afford protection against rises in price, enable long-term planning on
the basis of known costs, and obviate the expense and risk of shortage in the quantity
necessary for a commodity having a fluctuating demand. From the seller's point of
view, requirement contracts may make possible the substantial reduction of selling
expenses, give protection against price fluctuations and-of particular advantage to a
newcomer to the field to whom it is important to know what capital expenditures are
justified-offer the possibility of a predictable market.
Id at 306-07 (footnote omitted).
129. See note 126 supra
130. M. HANDLER, supra note 59, at 625.
131. United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 258 F. Supp. 36, 57, 59 (S.D.N.Y. 1966);
Dean, EconomicAspecs ofRecprocity, Competition and Mergers, 8 ANTITRUST BULL. 843, 852
(1963); see Hausman, ReciprocalDealingand the Antitrust Laws, 77 HARV. L. REv. 873, 882
(1964) (author suggests that virtually all non-barter acts of reciprocity should be considered
offensive per se).
132. The Supreme Court has never subjected reciprocity to the per se rule. In FTC v.
Consolidated Foods Corp., 380 U.S. 592 (1965), the practice was termed anticompetitive under
§ 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1976), but it was not found
inherently unlawful. See generally Ryals v. National Car Rental Sys., Inc., 404 F. Supp. 481,
485 (D. Minn. 1975).
Furthermore, coercive reciprocity is sufficiently similar to tie-in agreements in purpose
and effect to merit per se treatment. See note 8 and accompanying- text supra

allocation programs may also prohibit a reseller from transacting
business with a customer who has its residence or place of business
in the exclusive marketing area of another outlet. 133 Territorial
restrictions differ from exclusive dealing arrangements in that the
latter permit sales to a customer who resides at any location.
Intrabrand competition within a specific territory is eliminated to the
extent that territorial restrictions attain their objective, for each
outlet is the only one in the region that can supply the
manufacturer's products. Thus, the distributional process may be
hindered by vertical market division, especially when particular
products are most effectively marketed by a large number of outlets
in an area.134

Exclusive territories are granted to protect and stimulate the
reseller's efforts. A nonintegrated manufacturer135 might therefore
feel compelled to designate exclusive territories to obtain dealers
who will provide necessary. promotion and service.' 36 Because of
decreased intrabrand competition, market division also protects
37
skimming,"' 38
distributors' return on investment, prevents "cream
139
and encourages the provision of special services.
The Court in White Motor' hinted that market division might
be an acceptable vertical restraint for new or failing concerns, or for
133. Handler, Statement Before the Small Business Administration, 11 ANTITRUST BULL.
417, 427-28 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Statement].
134. Bork, supra note 51, at 454.
135. A manufacturer is nonintegrated when it does not distribute and retail the articles it
manufactures. See F. SCHERER, supra note 13, at 69-70.
136. Statement, supra note 133, at 428.
137. Maher, supra note 96, at 446.
138. "Cream skimming" occurs when a reseller from a different marketing area enters a
territory where the customers have been solicited by another reseller of the same brand.
Skimming is facilitated because the invading cross-seller incurs lower overhead costs with
respect to the sale. See note 139 infra The "cream" buyer is generally one who purchases
consistently and in relatively large quantities.
139. An invader is a free rider who need not expend presale efforts to obtain favor for the
brand it seeks to sell because this has been done by a dealer who has previously cultivated the
market area. Preselling expenses can be great, for instance, if these costs are required to
maintain an elaborate showroom, to provide complex or numerous demonstrations and to
employ an effective sales force. For a cross-seller to be successful it must only convince the
purchaser that the same brand should be bought from the invader in the future. Since the
invader has incurred lower costs, it can sell at a lower price (assuming that the expense of
transporting the items to the buyer does not make the cost of the transaction prohibitive) and
will presumably increase sales volume.
Of course, the free rider's costs in discovering the cream buyers may make the expense of
the venture prohibitive. See L. SULLIVAN, supra note 34, § 15, 145 at 420. Additionally,
there appears to be no reason why the invaded party cannot mount an offensive and enter the
initial invader's territory to recoup the lost sales.
The territorial restraint, however, is designed to prevent invasion and force the assigned
reseller to concentrate on the interbrand sales effort within its region. But if the purpose of
market division is to prevent free riders from cross-selling, this objective could be achieved by
the adoption of less restrictive "primary responsibility" clauses. Restricted Channels, supra
note 58, at 808, 827. These clauses require each reseller to obtain a minimum level of sales
within its own territory before transactions in other areas are allowed.
140. White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253 (1963).

businesses entering new product lines.' 4 1 Subsequent cases relied on
this message in White Motor to place an imprimatur on market
divisions instituted by a relatively large company engaged in active
competition 142 and on those imposed by a small firm that was merely
faltering. ' 43 Although the Sylvania decision adopted the theory that
vertical market division is beneficial because it protects resellers who
provide special services, the language used by the Court may
indicate that it is willing to apply this theory to other vertical
restraints. 44 When vertical territorial restrictions succeed, the
diminished intrabrand competition is replaced by intensified
these market divisions
interbrand competition, and consequently,
45
are subject to the rule of reason.'
4. Resale Price Maintenance.-

In contrast to these vertical

distributional restraints, resale price maintenance remains illegal per
se. It differs from some of the customer restrictions and the
exclusive dealing arrangements because it is procompetitive with
respect to brands of different producers. 146 It is similar to territorial
allocation to the extent that both sacrifice some degree of intrabrand
competition to augment the level of interbrand competition. Resale
price maintenance may be more efficient than market division
it concurrently serves additional
because it is more flexible 47 and
48
interests of the manufacturer.

141. Id at 263-64.
142. Snap-On Tools Corp. v. FTC, 321 F.2d 825 (7th Cir. 1963).
143. Sandura Co. v. FTC, 339 F.2d 847 (6th Cir. 1964). Sandura and Snap-On, see note
142 and accompanying text supra, were actions maintained under § 5 of the Federal Trade
Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1976). The plaintiffs burden under § 5 requires that an
unfair method of competition be proved, while liability under § I of the Sherman Act is based
on an unreasonable restraint of trade.
144. The Court catalogued the competitive benefits that arise from the use of vertical
restrictions in general, without distinguishing between vertical restraints. 433 U.S. 36, 55-56.
145. Id at 55; Artman v. International Harvester Co., 355 F. Supp. 476, 480 (D. Pa. 1972).
In dicta the Artman court declared that "a manufacturer is permitted to defend against a
Sherman Act claim by showing that he divided the geographical market among his retailing
representatives so as to encourage successful competition with retailers representing other
brands." Id at 480-81.
146. Resale price maintenance could impair interbrand competition when it prevents high
volume, low markup operations from discounting the merchandise. Bowman, supranote 52, at
848. To the extent that these businesses do not provide the levels of service, convenience, and
promotion that the price fixing producer deems necessary, resale price maintenance may
prevent these operations from carrying the manufacturer's goods because of a higher
minimum retail price. Cf. Davis v. Marathon Oil Co., 528 F.2d 395 (6th Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 823 (1976) (dealer was terminated for inadequately representing a
manufacturer's products); Germon v. Times Mirror Co., 520 F.2d 786 (9th Cir. 1975) (dealer
was terminated for failing to maintain its supplier's image).
147. Posner, supra note 13, at 294; see Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145, 151 n.7
(1968); text following notes 49-54 supra.
148. Vertical price restraints are valuable to the manufacturer when uniformity of sales
effort is important. Bork, supra note 51, at 453; cf., Phillips v. Crown Cent. Petroleum Corp.,
395 F. Supp. 735, 761 (D. Md. 1975) (the restraint may also promote optimum marketing from
the supplier's perspective). A manufacturer might set the resale price for products it wants

Vertical price fixing does not foreclose nonprice intrabrand
competition; to the contrary, this pricing restraint may even be used
to achieve the desired level of such competition.' 4 9 Market division,
however, eliminates intrabrand competition, at least insofar as
insurgents are unsuccessful 5 ' and the manufacturer remains

satisfied with the reseller's performance. Moreover, resale price
maintenance frustrates the free rider 5 ' dealer's efforts to undercut
the local distributor or dealer by circumscribing the pricing

discretion of all resellers.
In contrast to market division, price fixing compels the local
seller to use a degree of sales effort that stimulates interbrand
competition; 52 market division only allows this result.' 5 3 In
establishing a price, the producer must first determine the type of
services it wishes its dealer to provide. Theoretically, the
manufacturer then establishes the minimum resale price at a level
that would yield higher than competitive margins to the resellers if
no additional services or convenience were provided. 54 If the
dealers that carry the producer's items desire to ensure the stability
of or increase their sales volume, they will be motivated to offer a
more desirable bargain. Since the minimum price is imposed, the
dealers must compete on a nonprice level, constantly increasing
promotional activities and additional services until the profits return
to a normal level.' 55
In addition to the marketing benefits secured through the use of
resale price maintenance, this restraint also protects the
marketed uniformly over a large area. For example, a refiner might not allow its dealer; any
discretion regarding the retail price or the level of retail services because "the refiner may feel
that its business and marketing acumen is significantly greater than that of the general run of
people it can attract to be service station operators .. . [and because] a large part of the
refiner's brand appeal rests upon the uniformity of the product sold by each of its stations."
Bork, supra note 51, at 455. Contra, L. SULLIVAN, supra note 34, § 134 at 382. Professor
Sullivan categorizes centralized decision making on the appropriate levels of pricing and
promotion as "extravagant arrogance" because those decisions are made without the
"information which would be yielded by a competitive distributional system." Id
Furthermore, a manufacturer may have an interest in displaying a uniform price when its
products are sold in numerous areas. Although it is currently illegal per se under the Albrecht
decision, see note 94 and accompanying text supra the suggestion has been made that "price
tampering," such as advertising that a certain item may be purchased for "about X dollars,"
should be permitted. Elman, supra note 43, at 63 1.
Economics in advertising might also be facilitated by vertical price fixing for national
concerns such as national food franchisors or makers of widely advertised retail items. Local
dealers and distributors may lack the financial resources to promote the product intensively.
149. Posner, supra note 13, at 294; see text following notes 153-55 infra
150. See notes 138-39 supra
151. See note 193 supra.
152. Bork, supra note 51, at 454; see text following notes 156-58 infra
153. Bork, supra note 51, at 453.
154. Posner, supra note 13, at 284.
155. Id at 294. Maintenance and repair service for products such as automobiles and
major household appliances exemplify some of the "extras" that result from the imposition of
vertical price fixing. See Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 55 (1977).

manufacturer's goodwill. The producer may conclude that a
reduced price will not increase sales or revenues if advertising has
cultivated a prestige image for the article.'56 Products, the price of
which has been vertically imposed, also cannot detract from the
dealer's goodwill because of their use as "loss leaders."' 57
Price restraints, thus, protect manufacturers in two ways. First,
they prevent alienation of distributors and dealers that might
otherwise occur if resellers perceive that rivals are selling the same
brand at a significantly lower price and infer that the manufacturer
allowed the competitor a lower price. 15 This alienation could spawn
a decrease of outlets for the firm's products and a corresponding
decline in both interbrand and intrabrand competition.' 59 Second,
since the minimum price is fixed, the product will probably be priced
too high to be a suitable bait-and-switch device." 6 If the price level
were low enough to be so used, the interbrand competitive position
of the commodity would decline because
dealers might convince
61
brands.'
other
purchase
to
consumers
Resale price maintenance stimulates interbrand competition
more effectively than other vertical restrictions, the legality of which
are assessed under the rule of reason.'62 Consequently, classification
of the practice as illegal per se should be reconsidered.
156. L. SULLIVAN, supra note 34, § 134 at 384; e.g., But Will lt La1 FORBES, August 15,
1977 at 33.
As the 1970's got under way, the bottom fell out for Jade East. 'In this business we
have what we call "diverters".... You try to confine a product like Jade East to the
better-quality outlets. . . . But diverters will make a deal with a legitimate customer
to place an order for them in the customer's name, or else they'll pick up a retailer's
overstock, and they'll resell it. Pretty soon, your product is in every discount store in
town at cut rates. Then it loses its snob appeal.. the quality stores don't want to
carry it anymore.. . the public tires of it.'
Id (emphasis added).
157. "Loss leader" items are sold at great discounts from retail price and often at or below
the dealer's cost. E. MCCARTHY, BASIC MARKETING: A MANAGERIAL APPROACH 676-77 (4th
ed. 1971).
158. Eg., United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29, 34 (1960); See F. SCHERER,
supra note 13, at 514.
159. Bowman, supra note 52, at 837.
160. Bait advertising is "an alluring but insincere offer to sell a product or service which
the advertiser in truth does not intend or want to sell." 16 C.F.R. § 238.0 (1977); U.S. DEP'T
OF JUSTICE, THE INVESTIGATION OF WHITE-COLLAR CRIME 279 (1977). As long as the
minimum resale price is above an "alluring" amount, deceptive baiting practices will be
prevented.
161. Contra, Bowman, supra note 52, at 836. Bowman contends that if the bait-andswitch device draws prospective purchasers into stores, the competitive merits of the various
brands would cause consumers to purchase the better product and disregard any specious
"switching" arguments offered by salesmen. The pragmatic fallacy of this type of thinking is
revealed by the numerous consumer protection efforts to curb bait-and-switch practices. See,
e.g., Federal Trade Commission Gides Against Bait Advertising at 16 C.F.R. 238.3 (1977).
162. But see Pitotsky, The Sylvania Case: Antitrust Analysis of Nonprice Vertical
Restrictions, 78 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 16-17 (1978).

IV. The Appropriate Test of Legality for Resale Price
Maintenance
The per se rule constitutes a broad judicial generalization that a
prohibited practice is manifestly anticompetitive. According to the
Sylvania decision this prohibition should be imposed only when
[t]he probability that anticompetitive consequences will result
from a practice and the severity of these consequences... [outweigh] its procompetitive consequences. Cases that do not fit the
generalization may arise, but the per se rule reflects the judgment
that such cases are not sufficiently common or important to justify
the time and expense necessary to identify them. Once established, per se rules tend to provide guidance to the business community and to minimize the burdens on litigants and the judicial
system of the more complex rule-of-reason trials, .

.

. but those

advantages are not sufficient in themselves to justify the creation
of per se rules. If it were otherwise, all of antitrust law would be
reduced to per se rules, thus
introducing an unintended and unde16 3
sirable rigidity in the law.
Currently the law governing vertical price fixing is unjustifiably rigid
because the rationale for prohibiting resale price maintenance is no
longer valid. The restraint on alienation concept relied upon in Dr.
Miles has been abandoned as a tool of antitrust analysis. 6 Furthermore, the equation in Dr.Miles of the purpose and effect of horizontal restraints with vertical price fixing is incorrect and cannot justify
extending per se illegality to the vertical restraint. 6 Vertical price
restraints need be no more restrictive than is necessary to protect the
manufacturer's interests. 6 Resale price maintenance, however, can
also serve the public interest by preserving or increasing competition
among producers. 67 Justice White recognized that these considerations are fatal to a blanket prohibition of vertical price restraints in
his concurring opinion in Sylvania.'6 8 Since the majority in Sylvania
posited promotion of interbrand competition as the primary aim of
the antitrust laws 6 9 a manufacturer should be permitted to70prove
that the vertical restraint he has imposed is procompetitive.
This opportunity to prove procompetitive effects is even more
vital to criminal defendants. In 1974, amendments to the Sherman
Act increased the severity of penalties for violation of section 1 from
163. Continental TV., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 50 n.16 (1977) (emphasis

added).

164. See text accompanying notes 64-65 and 103 supra
165. See text accompanying notes 55-59 supra
166. See notes 147-49 and accompanying text supra
167. See notes 152-55 and accompanying text supra:
168. 433 U.S. at 70. Commentators have taken the same position. See remarks by M.
Lawrence Popofsky (author of Sylvania's brief to the Supreme Court) and Professor Richard
A. Posner in ANTITRUST & TRADE Ro. REP. (BNA) 2-A-3-A (Nov. 10, 1977).
169. 433 U.S. at 52 n.19.
170. This requires that the determinant of legality be the competitive effects of the restraint. Elman, supra note 43, at 628. But see Rahl, supra note 43, at 142.

a misdemeanor to a felony. 171 The collateral consequences of felony
conviction 17 2 in addition to substantial direct penalties' 73 should entitle these defendants to the rights traditionally accorded to accused
felons. Those fundamental rights were recently acknowledged in
74
United States v. Nu-Phonics, Inc. 1

The most appropriate burden of proof in most civil and crimi-

75
nal prosecutions would thus be imposed under the rule of reason. 1

The plaintiff would have to prove that the pricing policy restrained

trade and that the restraint was unreasonable. 176 The defendant
could vindicate itself either by disproving the existence of the re77
straint or by showing that the restraint was reasonable.
Vertical price restrictions, however, need not be removed from
179
8
se
per rule condemnation in every civil action.17 The Sylvania test

provides that the per se prohibition is inapplicable if procompetitive
consequences clearly outweigh the anticompetitive results of the
171. Antitrust Penalties and Procedures Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-528, § 3, 88 Stat. 1708
(1976) (amending 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970)). Conviction under amended § I now carries penalties
of up to three years of imprisonment and a fine of up to one hundred thousand dollars for
natural persons and up to one million dollars for corporations. Id
Despite this increase in penalty, "[p]rice fixing is simply not intrinsically a moral wrong."
Rahl, supra note 43, at 148. The disparity between the potential punishment and moral culpability may militate against the per se illegality of resale price maintenance.
172. Eg., United States v. Nu-Phonics, Inc., 433 F. Supp. 1006, 1010 (D. Mich. 1977)
(convicted felons are often prohibited from obtaining various types of licenses).
173. See note 171 upra.
174. 433 F. Supp. 1006 (D. Mich. 1977). In Nu-Phonics the defendants were charged with
a horizontal price fixing conspiracy. The government moved in limine to have certain evidence
excluded because a per se offense was alleged. The district court held, inter alia, that the
defendants could prove that their actions had no anticompetitive effects, and that if an agreement existed, defendants could prove that it had no anticompetitive purpose.
175. The classic rule of reason formulation is found in Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United
States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918):
The true test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is such as merely regulates
and perhaps thereby promotes competition or whether it is such as may suppress or
even destroy competition. To determine that question the court must ordinarily consider the facts peculiar to the business to which the restraint is applied; its condition
before and after the restraint was imposed; the nature of the restraint and its effect,
actual or probable. The history of the restraint, the evil believed to exist, the reason
for adopting the particular remedy, the purpose or end sought to be attained, are all
relevant facts. That is not because a good intention will save an otherwise objectionable regulation, or the reverse; but because knowledge of intent may help the court to
interpret facts and to predict consequences.
Id at 238.
176. See United States v. Empire Gas Corp., 537 F.2d 296, 308 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1122 (1977); Sheldon Pontiac v. Pontiac Motor Div., Gen'l Motors Corp., 418 F.
Supp. 1024, 1029 (1976).
177. See notes 180-82 and accompanying text infra for circumstances in which the restraint would be reasonable.
178. E.g., Phillips v. Crown Cent. Petroleum Corp., 395 F. Supp. 735 (D. Md. 1975) (resale price maintenance was used pursuant to a horizontal restraint among fuel suppliers in the
Baltimore area with no promotion of interbrand competition).
If resale price maintenance were ultimately deemed so heinous as to merit per se condemnation under all circumstances, this judgment could be most effectively expressed in an
amendment to the antitrust laws.
179. See text accompanying note 163 supra.

practice. The circumstances in which resale price maintenance
would pass this test are limited and readily discernible. Price re-

straints are clearly procompetitive when the supplier is (1) failing or
faltering,' (2) a new enterprise or an established concern entering
a
8 2
new line of business,' or (3) imposing maximum resale prices.
If the liability of defendants whose business operations fall
within one of the first two categories were assessed by the rule of
reason, these defendants might show that the practice was employed
solely to repair or maintain a market position that is competitive
with other producers. While interbrand rivalry is preserved or pro-

moted, intrabrand competition is constrained only in relation to
price and encouraged in other aspects. 83 As long as market contingencies require that the supplier fix resale prices, the restraint may be
found reasonable.'18 But if vertically imposed prices are used longer

than necessary--that is, beyond the faltering or new entry stage--the
business practice will lose its redeeming virtue and should be condemned on a per se basis.

Restraints falling within the third category, the imposition of
maximum resale prices, should be judged according to the reason-

ableness of the restraint because (assuming that it is not imposed for
predatory purposes) they will ultimately improve the competitive
stance of the product. 8 5 Application of the rule of reason to maxi-

mum pricing would not validate the practices, but would permit defendants to show that the scheme did not create an unreasonable
restraint of trade. Enlightened self-interest should prevent manu-

facturers from setting the maximum price so low that it yields an
inadequate profit for the reseller and a consequent loss of resellers.
These three exceptions from per se illegality are appropriate be-

cause they may be procompetitive in effect 86 and promote the manufacturer's interest in the distribution of its product.8 7 Yet, merely
because these categories are readily definable does not suggest that
resale price maintenance would be unjustifiable in other circumstances.' 8 If rule of reason trials were available only in these three
180. See notes 79-81, 89-93 and accompanying text supra.
181. See notes 82-93 and accompanying text supra
182. See notes 94-99 and accompanying text supra.
183. See notes 152-55 and accompanying text supra,
184.
White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 270 n.9 (1963) (Brennan, J.,
concurring) (restraints that are excessive in relation to the manufacturer's needs invite suspicion); United States v. Columbia Pictures Corp., 189 F. Supp. 153, 178 (S.D.N.Y. 1960) (addressing ancillary restraints that are more restrictive than necessary); Maher, supra note 99, at
463 (noting that vertical restraints removed from per se condemnation by Sylvania must be
demonstrably used for a procompetitive objective).
185. See text accompanying note 97 supra.
186. See text accompanying notes 78-93 (failing firms, new entrants) and text accompanying notes 97-99 (maximum resale price fixing) supra.
187. See note 105 and accompanying text supra
188. Eg., Eastern Scientific Co. v. Wild Heerbrugg Instruments, Inc., 572 F.2d 883 (1st

q7.

special cases, some defendants might be unfairly precluded from introducing evidence to prove that their conduct did not unreasonably
restrain trade.
Another solution might be to apply to the restraint a rebuttable
presumption of illegality. 8 9 Under a presumptive illegality test the
plaintiff's burden of proof would remain the same as under the per se
rule; the plaintiff need only prove facts constituting the restriction.
The defendant would then have to support its position by demonstrating that its practice was reasonable. If the defendant is unable to
muster sufficient evidence to rebut the presumption of illegality, the
restraint will be judged unlawful.
It is unlikely that the Supreme Court will adopt the presumptive
illegality standard, at least in the immediate future, because it would
so drastically deviate from long-established precedent."9t Furthermore, the adoption of the presumptive illegality test could increase
and prolong litigation.' 9 ' Section 1 defendants might seek a trial
while using every dilatory tactic to obtain the maximum benefit from
Cir. 1978) (imposition of resale price maintenance as ancillary to a territorial allocation is
subject to the rule of reason).
189. An analogically instructive problem was raised in White Motor Co. v. United States,
372 U.S. 253 (1963), in which the Court declined to subject White's distribution system to
either per se illegality or the rule of reason because the Court lacked adequate knowledge to
identify any redeeming virtue or to analyze "the economic and business stuff out of which
these arrangements emerge" to determine the reasonableness of the restrictions. Id at 263.
Presumptive illegality may fill the informational void by requiring defendants to present
clear justification for their restraints and concurrently relieve the courts of the need to determine whether outright prohibition is appropriate or whether the plaintiff should bear the burden of proof in a rule of reason trial.
As the government contended on appeal of the Schwinn case to the Supreme
Court, a practice shown to be substantially restrictive of price competition is at least
primafarie unreasonable under antitrust law, in the sense that, if the defendant offers
no evidence in justification of the restraint, the government is not obliged to disprove
justifications that might have been but were not advanced.
Brief for Appellant at 38, United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967). The
presumption of illegality was not adopted in that case because the government made the contention only upon its appeal to the Supreme Court, which was viewed as an improper time in
the judicial disposition of the case. 388 U.S. at 374 n.5.
In merger litigation the doctrine of presumptive illegality has been more favorably received. In United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963) the doctrine was
applied to ease "the burden of proving illegality. . . with respect to mergers whose size makes
them inherently suspect in light of Congress' design in § 7 [of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 18
(1976)] to prevent undue concentration." Id at 363.
190. Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911).
191. See Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 50 n.16 (1977); United
States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596 (1972). Mr. Justice Harlan addressed the problem of
judicial economy in applying the per se rule to horizontal territorial allocations by noting that
the "courts are of limited utility in examining difficult economic problems. Our inability to
weigh, in any meaningful sense, destruction of competition in one sector of the economy
against promotion of competition in another sector is one important reason we have formulated per se rules." Id at 609-10 (footnote omitted). But see Vertical Restrictions, supra note
83, at 515 (general evaluation of competitive effects of vertical restrictions is preferable to an
inflexible, non-evaluative standard).

the restraint. 92 Procedural tactics would not differ from those currently used in per se cases, but the mere opportunity to present a
defense may result in the issuance of fewer consent decrees.' 93 If the
decision to alter the standard of legality ultimately rests on some
form of pragmatic cost-benefit analysis, the presumptive illegality
concept would certainly fall to the per se rule.' 94
V.

Conclusion

Resale price maintenance impedes free market competition by
withdrawing pricing discretion from resellers and, thus, contravenes
laissez-faire economics. 9 Perfect competition, however, is merely a

concept. 196
The Supreme Court's recent interpretation of section 1 of the
Sherman Act' 97 sanctions vertical restraints that diminish intrabrand
competition, if they promote interbrand competition sufficiently.
Vertical price fixing can more effectively stimulate interbrand rivalry
than other vertical restrictions currently permitted under the Sherman Act. 198 But if vertical price fixing were declared lawful, its use
must be narrowly circumscribed. Since a fundamental objective of
this restraint is to eliminate free riders that would conduct business
while incurring less overhead expenses than their competitors, 99 resale price maintenance should be permitted when the nature of the
article sold would permit the existence of free riders. Furthermore,
when vertical price restraints do not establish a price ceiling, they
should be limited to businesses that would be likely to fail,2°° and
then only until the enterprise secures a competitive position.
Resale price maintenance can serve both the manufacturer's
and the public interest, but until the per se rule is no longer applied,
the benefits of vertical price restraint will remain conjecture.
HARRY

A. HORWITZ

192. See Withrow & Latin, The "Big" Antitrust Case: 25 Years of Sisyahean Labor, 62
CORNELL L. REV. 1 (1976) (concluding that equitable and expeditious disposition of complex
adjudications are impeded by excessive deference to adversary jurisprudence, broad discovery

and jury trials).
193. But see Rashid, Settlements and Consent Decrees, 42 ANTITRUST L.J. 110, 112-13
(1972) (Justice Department may more readily accede to compromise civil consent decrees
when the expense of litigation far outweighs the potential relief of a successful adjudication).
194. Thus the clear delineation of prohibited trade practices that the per se rule provides
may be perceived as being more valuable than the flexible and undoubtedly more expensive

use of presumptions.
195. See P. SAMUELSON, ECONOMICS 43 (9th ed. 1973). See a/so H. THORELLI, THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY 1 (1954) (observing that the Sherman Act itself is a deviation from

laiss;ez faire).
1%.
197.
198.
199.

P. SAMUELSON, upra note 195 at 43.
Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
See text accompanying notes 106-145 supra.
See notes 139 and 151 and accompanying text supra

200.

Those enterprises likely to fail include new entrants as well as failing companies.

